According to the literature on EP elections, parties do not offer real choices on European integration to voters. Indeed, in most EU countries there has been broad consensus between the main parties about integration.
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Mikko Mattila and Tapio Raunio dimension as being the distance between the two parties that occupy the extreme positions at both ends of that dimension. The higher the range, the more alternatives citizens have. In their analysis of the left-right dimension in the Nordic party systems, Gilljam and Oscarsson (1996: 26) refer to range as 'wing party distance', meaning the difference between the most left-wing and the most right-wing party on that dimension. In order to avoid a situation where a truly minuscule party would impact on our findings, we include only parties that won at least 3 % of the votes in the respective EP elections or in the preceding national parliamentary elections in our analysis.
However, range or wing party distance is not a concept without its problems.
After all, the parties holding extreme positions could well be parties that most citizens would never consider voting for, such as extreme right or left parties, and hence one could argue that one should focus instead on the differences between the ideologically moderate 'mainstream' parties. Hence we also use another measurement of alternatives offered to voters: following Mair and Castles (1997: 154) we measure the difference between the two largest parties on that same policy dimension 1 . As this study focusses on the EU dimension, this clarification is arguably very important. Previous literature has shown that Euroscepticism is mainly the preserve of ideologically extremist or populist parties, i.e. more or less the same group of parties that are excluded from government in their member states (Taggart 1998 , Hooghe et al. 2002 . As most Europeans are not prepared to vote for such parties, it is also necessary to analyse the differences between the main political parties in each member state.
In addition, we employ a third operationalization that captures the nature of party competition over integration and the existence of choices on offer more effectively. This measurement is variance of party positions on the EU dimension, which we compute without taking into account the weight of parties. We feel that this non-weighted variance is more useful for our analysis, as we are primarily interested in the range of alternatives available
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to the electorate and as our second operationalization already measures the differences between the two main parties in each country (see van der Eijk & Franklin 2004: 41) .
But what produces ideological differences between political parties? And more specifically, when and why do parties adopt different positions on European integration? In this paper we put forward three rival explanations.
According to the first perspective, ideological range on the EU dimension is a function of public opinion. Thomassen & Schmitt 1997 , 1999 Schmitt & Thomassen 2000.) Two analyses that focus on the same elections that we examine in this paper are particularly interesting in this respect. Using data from the 1999 EES, van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) showed that the diversity of opinion among the electorate was not reflected at party level. There was thus, according to those authors, 'potential for contestation' on EU matters, with the EU issue being a 'sleeping giant' in European politics. The study also showed the parties to be far more supportive of integration than were the voters. Analysing issue agreement in the 2004 EP elections, Mattila and Raunio (2006) concluded that parties were closer to their voters on the left/right dimension than on the EU dimension and that they were more supportive of European integration than their voters. That study also confirmed that political parties, at least in Next we hypothesize that the dispersion of parties on the left-right dimension is reflected or reproduced on the EU dimension -that is, the higher the level of choices on the left-right dimension, the greater the dispersion of parties on the EU dimension (H4). The location of parties on the left-right dimension is derived from the EES question, where the respondents were asked to place themselves and the parties on that dimension. Finally, our last set of hypotheses examines whether specific EU factors impact on the choices parties offer over Europe. We expect to find that the timing of membership will matter (measured as the number of years elapsed since a country joined the Union), with the level of alternatives being greater in newer member countries (H6). The argument here is that in the older member countries, particularly in the six founding member states that had already joined the integration process in the 1950s, EU membership is a fact of life that is no longer contested among the political parties. In contrast, in the countries that joined the EU more recently, European integration is a new issue that produces more divisions within and between the parties.
Furthermore, the membership referenda that took place in those countries This paper's main interest is the location of parties on the EU dimension.
This was operationalized in the EES questionnaire as a 1-10 scale measuring respondents' attitudes towards European unification. The exact wording of the question was: 'Some say European unification should be pushed further.
Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-scale. On this scale, 1 means unification "has already gone too far" and 10 means it "should be pushed further". What number on this scale best describes your position?' This question was followed by several questions where the respondents were asked to indicate, using the same scale, where the main parties of their respective countries were located. We measure party positions simply as a mean perception of the party location on both the EU and the left/right dimensions calculated from all respondents in a given member state. showed that all measures correlate considerably with each other and, thus, measure the same thing (Marks et al. 2006) . Table 1 The length of EU membership is clearly not connected to the level of choices offered by the parties. Some of the member states have been EU members for almost fifty years while the ten new member states entered their first EP elections right after their accession in 2004. One might assume that fifty years of EU membership would affect party competition on integration matters but this seems not to be the case. However, there is a statistically significant relationship between the length of EU membership and the distance between the two main parties: the longer a country has been an EU member, the less there is contestation between the main parties on the EU dimension. 
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Conclusions
The results of our empirical analysis are quite interesting and even 
Afterword
We received highly useful comments on our paper in the Lisbon meeting.
Below are our reflections on the comments, together with our own ideas on how to revise the paper for future publication.
Most of the comments focused on our hypotheses. Gábor Tóka suggested that we should spell out the logic behind the hypotheses better. He recommended merging hypotheses 1 (the higher the level of support for EU membership in the country, the smaller the range on the EU dimension) and 2 (the more polarized public opinion is on Union membership, the greater the range on the EU dimension), and clarifying the relationship between H3 (the more fragmented the party system, the greater the range of alternatives on the EU dimension) and H5 (the higher the number of government parties, the smaller the breadth of alternatives). He also suggested that we should turn our expectation that range on the EU dimension would increase from 1999 to 2004 into a hypothesis. Finally, he asked why -according to the responsible model of party government -it is a disaster if parties converge ideologically.
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Hermann Schmitt recommended that we should have a measure for the saliency of the EU, with the idea being that higher salience would produce more ideological alternatives around integration. Mark Franklin was critical of our operationalization of the economic benefits hypothesis, and suggested that we should look for better indicators than whether countries are net contributors to the EU budget (H7).
Gábor Tóka also commented on the methodological side of our paper. In particular, he pointed out that, in addition to our measures of subjective views of party positions, we could use expert survey data to cross-validate our party position measures. Furthermore, he recommended that we could use factor analysis or structural equation models to reduce the 'noise' in our dependent variable.
We feel that these points, and particularly thoses raised by Gábor Tóka and Hermann Schmitt, must be taken into account when revising the piece. We need to rethink some of the logic behind the hypotheses and to explain in more detail the expected direction of causality. We also agree that we should turn the longitudinal comparison between the 1999 and 2004 EP elections into a proper hypothesis. The point about salience is something we thought about when writing the paper, but we could not come up with a good measurement of salience. This is clearly something we need to address in the future.
In general, the paper is somewhat short. It clearly needs a better theory section, where we should elaborate in more detail on what factors could produce more ideological divergence between political parties. In this theory section we also need to reflect upon why it is important that parties offer rival choices on European integration to the electorate.
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Notes 1 Mair and Castles (1997: 154) refer to this measure as 'degree of core divergence'.
2 However, some of these studies paint a more positive picture. Comparing voters'
perceptions of where parties stand with voters' own preferences from a survey carried out right after the 1989 EP elections, van der Eijk and Franklin (1991: 124) showed that most parties were representative of their voters in integration matters, with 'only a few parties' taking positions that were clearly out of line with the position of their voters. And, based on elite and citizen survey data from 1979 and 1994, Schmitt and Thomassen (2000) showed that while the policy preferences of the voters and the parties did diverge, issue agreement between voters and party elites about the general development of integration ('are you for or against efforts being made to unify Europe?') was as high as on the left-right dimension. Thus they argued that while policy representation may be failing in specific EU policy issues, it did seem to work fairly well as far as the overall development of integration is concerned. Although Flanders and Wallonia are not EU member states, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to our 37 cases as "member states" or as "member countries" in the text.
